SUMMARY
Based on a comparison of the known constituents in high-level nuclear waste stored at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and explosive compounds reported in the literature, fifteen classes of compounds were identified as conceivably being present in tank farm operations. Appendix 3 provides a comprehensive list of conceivable explosive compounds. Of the fifteen classes of explosive compounds, eleven classes --metal fulminates, metal azides, halogen compounds, metal-amine complexes, metal NOX compounds, nitrate/oxalate mixtures, metal oxalates, metal oxohalogenates, metal cyanides/cyanates, peroxides, and metal acetylides --are not a hazard because these .
compounds cannot be formed or accumulated in sufficient quantity, or are not reactive at the conditions that exist in the tank farm facilities. Four classes of explosive compounds, flammable gases, metal nitrides, ammonia compounds and derivatives, and organic compounds, have the potential to buildup to concentrations at which an observable reaction may occur. Controls have been in place for some time to limit the formation or control the concentration of these classes of compounds.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1970, many studies have been conducted concerning the potential for explosive compounds in tank farm operations including ammonium nitrate, metal oxalates, and silver and mercury compounds. The study currently in progress is the most comprehensive to date, encompassing all previous studies and extending the scope to include all compounds that could be formed from the known species in SRS wastes. In addition to waste storage, the study also considers waste removal and waste processing operations.
The total number of possible explosive compounds is so large that it would not be useful to list them all here. Instead, only those compounds are listed that are known to be present or could conceivably be formed from material that is known to be present in the waste. The general approach to the problem is: (1) identify all of the constituents that are known to be present in the waste together with those that might be present from possible chemical and radiolytic reactions, (2) determine the compounds that could be formed from these constituents, (3) compare these compounds with those listed in the literature, and (4) assess the formation and stability of these compounds against the conditions existing in the tank farm facilities.
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DISCUSSION

General Description of Waste Storage and Processing
The Savannah River Site has two high-level nuclear waste storage areas. These areas are located in F-Area and H-Area adjacent to the separations canyons. The storage facilities consist of 49 underground carbon steel storage tanks, three waste evaporators, and undergf-ound transfer lines. The transfer lines allow waste to be transported from the waste generator to the tanks, from tank to tank, from tanks to evaporators, between the two tank farms, and to the Defense Waste Processing and Saltstone facilities. * High-level waste (HLW) generators include chemical separations reactors, decontamination facilities, the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF), the Receipt Basin for Off-Site Fuels (R130F), analytical laboratories, research and development laboratories and the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). Historically, chemical separations have produced the majority of the HLW at the SRS. However, the DWPF is no-w a major producer of waste that enters into the Tank Farm. I
All HLW must meet the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) established for the operation of the two tank farms [1] . Each generator has developed a waste compliance plan to establish that the waste meets the WAC [2-5]. WAC criteria include requirements for corrosion protection, prevention of flarnmable/explosive species accumulation, regulatory compliance, criticality safety, radionuclide content and downstream facility acceptance criteria.
Before waste is transfemed into a tank, the waste generator is required to make the waste alkaline to prevent general corrosion of the waste tanks. The degree of alkalinity is determined by the chemical composition of the waste. For Separations waste, the free hydroxide concentration in fresh waste must be greater than 1.2 molar. Because of the high pH, the majority of the metal ions precipitate as metal hydroxides or hydrous metal oxides.
Fresh waste transfers into fresh-waste receipt tanks. Upon standing -the precipitated metal oxides and hydroxides, referred to as sludge, settle at the bottom of the tank. The supematant liquid above the settled sludge is decanted and sent to an evaporator for concentration. After evaporation, the concentrated liquid transfers to a concentrate receipt tank and cools. Upon cooling, salts crystallize from the concentrated supematant liquid. After a period of time, the cooled concentrated supematant liquid is decanted and returned to the evaporator feed tank.
Historically, operating practices limited the drying of waste during the storage and handling operations. Generally a layer of supematant liquid is maintained on top of the sludge or salt in each tank. However, several tanks do not have measurable quantities of freestanding liquid over the solids. Solids in these tanks will have reduced water content due to evaporation. The degree of dryness is unknown, as there have been no attempts to sample and analyze the solids for water content. The solids are not expected to be completely dry throughout the solids layer since the waste temperatures are less than 75 "C [6].
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The High Level Waste Division declared a potential inadequacy in the safety analysis (PISA) for the dry sludge tanks in 1997 (currently tanks 5F, 12H and 15H; tanks 6F and 8F formerly were dry, but have recently been rewetted) due to concerns related to the release of dry sludge particles [7] . Explosive compounds are generally more reactive when dry [8, 9 ]. An extensive research program initiated in 1998 to assess storage of dried sludge [10] . Four reports have issued detailing the results of characterization of three sludge samples archived at the SRTC and calorimetry and impact testing of simulated sludge samples [11, 71, 112, 119] . Based oh the experimental findings, the authors concluded the following. Differential scanning calorimetry analysis of Tank 8F, Tank 12H and Tank 15H samples showed no exothermic behavior to temperatures as high as 400 'C. Experimental evidence does not preclude the formation of energetic materials in the waste tanks during dry storage. However, simulated sludge with conservatively high concentrations of mercury and silver failed to show any exothermic behavior without deliberate addition of such compounds.
Mixtures of sludge with mercury oxalate showed no net exothermic behavior under the conservative conditions tested. Testing with mercury fulminate required addition of relatively high concentrations in simulated sludge to provide a relatively low energy exothennic reaction. Calorimetry data suggest the presence of the principal organic compounds of interest within simulated sludge does not enhance the energetic behavior of the material, even when both. the organic and the energetic standard (i.e., mercury oxalate or mercury fulminate) exist in conservatively high concentrations. Silver nitride, mercury oxalate and mercury fulminate decompose under tank conditions of radiation and alkalinity and, therefore, cannot accumulate to present an explosion hazard in dry sludge tanks.
Based upon the recommendation made by the Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center [118] , testing continues to determine the effects of extended contact with hydroxide and radiation effects on the energetic behavior of simulated sludges and Millon's base. This work will confirm that the tank environment (high hydroxide and radiation field) destroys energetic materials introduced or formed in Tank Farm facilities, All transfer lines are sloped to ensure that waste drains to a waste tanks or other acceptable storage location (e.g., pump tank) after transfer. Experience has shown that solids do not accumulate in transfer lines except in evaporator concentrate lines, which handle hot, supersaturated salt solutions. These lines plug occasionally due to salt crystallization. To avoid plugs, evaporator concentrate lines are flushed frequently to prevent the accumulation of solids. Evaporators are also flushed when shut-down to remove as much residual waste as possible. Small amounts of dried waste can be produced when waste has leaked into a secondary enclosure and evaporates. Examples of leaked waste that possibly have formed dried deposits include (1) leaks from the primary tank into the tank annulus, (2) leaks into the waste feed-jet enclosure, and (3) leaks into the evaporator cell. In ITP, supernatant liquid is treated with sodium tetraphenylborate and monosodium titanate to remove cesium and strontium. The resulting solids containing cesium and strontium are separated from the liquid by filtration and washed with water to reduce the soluble salt content. The washed solids are stored in a waste tank until transferred to the DWPF for processing into a borosilicate glass wasteform. The decontaminated supernatant liquid is stored in a separate waste tank until transfemed to the SaltStone facility for processing into a cement wasteform. Wash waters are recycled in the process so as to dilute concentrated supernatant liquid.
The ITP process became operational in 1995. However, as the result of operational problems, the process was discontinued in January 1998. Tank 48H stores the precipitate slurry produced from the 1983 Demonstration and Batch 1. Tank 49H currently stores wash water from the 1983 Demonstration.
Evaluation of salt processing alternatives selected four possible processes for treating soluble wastes; (1) Small Tank Tetraphenylborate (STT) process, (2) Non-elutable Ionexchange (NIX), (3) Caustic Side Solvent Extraction (CSSE) and (4) Direct Grout (DG) [109] . New facilities will be constructed for each option. The STT process features the same process chemistry as previously described for the ITP process. The major difference is that in the STT process, precipitation will be carried out in relatively small continuously stirred tank reactors (ea. 20000 gallons) versus a 1.3 million gallon waste tank. The MX process features a non-eluatable ion-exchange material, crystalline silicotitanate (CST) to remove radiocesium from the radioactive waste solution. The CSSE process features a novel extraction system that selectively removes cesium from alkaline waste solutions. The DG process would not remove the radiocesium from the liquid waste, but incorporate all liquid waste in a grout formulation. All four options would include strontium and alpha removal utilizing the inorganic sorbent monosodium titanate. In the SIT process, the MST step occurs at the same stage as the tetraphenylborate precipitation. For the other three options, the MST strike proceeds the cesium separation or immobilization stage.
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In ESP, the soluble salts in sludge waste are removed by diluting the waste with water, mixing, allowing the slurry to settle and decanting off the supematant liquid. This method of washing is continued until the soluble salt content meets the requirement for processing in the DWPF. For sludge waste containing high levels of aluminum, sodium hydroxide is added and the mixture heated to dissolve the alumina. After dissolution of the alumina, the sludge is washed with water to remove soluble salts. Wash waters are evaporated or recycled into waste removal operations. WSRC-TR-91-444, revision 3 page -8-Waste Constituents High-level nuclear waste is stored at the SRS in a highly alkaline form in underground carbon steel tanks. Because of the high pH, the waste consists of two phases, a liquid phase, comprised of water-soluble salts, and a solid phase or sludge, comprised of hydrous oxides of various metal ions. Appendices 1 and 2 list the compounds known to be present in the supernatant liquid and the sludge fractions of the waste. The average and bounding values are based on analysis of samples "taken from waste tanks, essential material records and process knowledge. The average values assume a perfect blend of all waste [12, 13] . 
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Through 1984, it has been estimated that 395,000 kilograms of tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP) had been discharged to the tank farm [16] . Hydrolysis and radiolytic decomposition of the TPB produces n-butanol, di-n-butyl phosphate, mono-n-butyl phosphate, carbon dioxide, and inorganic phosphates.
Ion-exchange resins that have been used at SRS in production facilities include polystyrene, macroporous styrene-divinylbenzene, and polyvinylpyridine. An estimated 56,400 kilograms of ion-exchange resin has been sent to the tank farms though 1984 [16] . Individual transfers of resins are limited to the total quantity of resin contained in an ionexchange column (generally less than 50 kilograms). Approximately two-thirds of the resin was digested with potassium permanganate prior to transfer. The digestion process chemically breaks the resin into smaller molecular weight fragments and solubilizes the resin by formation of hydroxyl and carboxylate groups. During storage, radiolysis slowly converts resins to carbon dioxide, hydrogen, and volatile monomeric organic compounds such as trimethylarnine and methane. The rate of production of flammable radiolysis products is slow and much lower than that for the production of hydrogen by the radiolysis of water [ The Ill? process has been discontinued. However, organic compounds from the use of sodium tetraphenylborate during the 1983 Demonstration and Batch 1 of the ITP operation are present in decreasing amounts in three ttiks, 48H, 49H and 50H. As discussed previously, WSRC is currently evaluating four options for processing t radioactive waste solutions. Since there has not been a decision on which process will be implemented, we evaluated the possible impacts of chemicals used in each process on I tank farm operations in this report.
CST is a non-elutable ion-exchanger material that is comprised chiefly of silicon, titanium and oxygen with smaller amounts of proprietary elements. The engineered form contains a binder to assemble the small CST primary particles into a relatively large aggregate that can be used in an ion-exchange column with reasonable superficial liquid velocities and pressure drops. A small fraction of the elemental components of the CST would be expected to return to the tank farm in the DWPF recycle stream.
The CSSE system employs a solvent system comprised of a calixarene crown, bis(tertoctylbenzo-crown-6)calix[4]arene (BoBCalixC6) and a modifier, 1-(1,1,2,2-te&afluoroethoxy) -3-(4-teti-octylphenoxy) -2-propanol (CS-3), dissolved in a branched aliphatic hydrocarbon diluent, Isopar@ L [110] . Plans include adding trioctylamine to the solvent to enhance cesium removal from the solvent during the stripping stage of the process. Small amounts of these organic compounds would be sent forward with the decontaminated salt solution and disposed in Saltstone. Very small amounts of these organic compounds would be introduced in the tank farm facilities resulting from solvent cleanup and return of the DWPF recycle stream.
Possible Classes of Explosive Compounds
Fifteen classes of explosive compounds were identified as conceivably being present in SRS tank farm facilities by comparing the list of known elements and species in current or planned chemical processing operations with explosive compounds and reactions listed in the literature [8, 9, 19] . Table II provides a list of the fifteen classes of compounds. Appendix 3 provides a comprehensive list of conceivable explosive compounds.
Eleven of the fifteen classes were eliminated as possible hazards based on a review of the formation and stability of individual compounds at the conditions that exist in storage and processing operations and experimental testing. The eleven classes are metal fulminates, metal azides, metal NOX compounds, halogen compounds, metal-amine complexes, nitrate/oxalate mixtures, metal oxalates, metal oxohalogenates, metal cyanides and cyanates, and peroxides. Four classes, flammable gases, metal nitrides, ammonia I compounds and derivatives, and organic compounds have the potential to build up to concentrations at which an observable reaction might occur. Specific compounds of these three classes include hydrogen, benzene, silver nitride, ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrite, and potassium tetraphenylborate.
Administrative and engineering WSRC-TR-91-444, revision 3 page-11 -February, 2000 I controls have been in place for some time to limit the formation or concentration of these compounds in tank farm facilities. Nitrated organic compounds (e.g., nitrophenol and nitrosophenol) have been detected in off-gas streams from laboratory and pilot-scale tests simulating DWPF operations and in qualification tests conducted at the DWPF. The origin of the aromatic compounds arises from processing tetraphenylborate slurries received from the ITP process in the Salt Processing Cell of the DWPF. ITP operations halted in 1998 prior to transfer of any radioactive tetraphenylborate slurries to the DWPF. Thus only minor quantities of aromatic compounds have been collected at the DWPF during cold chemical qualification testing and returned to the tank farm. Nevertheless, significant testing occurred prior to halting ITP operations to determine what concentrations these compounds will be in the recycle stream, and if sufficient quantities can accumulate to present a hazard. Table 111 provides a list of the specific organic compounds identified and tested in these studies. Table III 
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Effects of Radiation on Explosive Compounds
The effects of nuclear radiation on explosives has been studied extensively [20 and references cited therein]. Exposure of energetic materials to radiation produces changes in the materials including weight loss, gas evolution, mechanical sensitivity, thermal sensitivity and stability and explosive performance. In general, energetic materials decompose without detonation or deflagration upon exposure to nuclear radiation. Nitrogen triiodide is the only material reported to detonate upon exposure to nuclear radiation. This compound detonated when exposed to either alpha radiation or an electron beam. The detonation was attributed in part to localized heating of the material.
Detonation of energetic materials by exposure to steady-state gamma and neutron irradiation has not been observed. All testing results indicated that steady-state gamma and neutron irradiation slowly decomposes the energetic material resulting in deterioration in the functional performance of the energetic materials. Energetic materials evaluated included both inorganic (including mercury fulminate) and organicbased explosives. The degree and rate of decomposition is dependent on the explosive material. Given the high gamma and neutron irradiation fields in the HLW storage tanks, the likelihood that explosive compounds would remain in a highly energetic form for extended periods of time is extremely low.
CLASSES KNOWN TO EXIST BUT CONTROLLED
Flammable Gases Hydrogen and oxygen are produced in the waste storage tanks as a result of the radiolysis of water. The hydrogen generation rate in SRS waste tanks is bounded at s6.0 ft3/million BTU of fission product heat [21] . The hydrogen generation rate also depends upon the concentrations of nitrate and nitrite in solution [22, 111] . An increase in the nitrate and nitrite concentrations decreases the rate of hydrogen generation. Since nitrate and nitrite are major constituents of the high-level nuclear waste, the hydrogen generation rate in the waste solutions is suppressed relative to that of pure water. To prevent the accumulation of explosive mixtures of hydrogen and the buildup of high oxygen concentrations in the vapor space of the waste tanks, all of the tanks are equipped with an active ventilation system. Air is pulled through the tank to maintain a slight negative pressure. Typically, the flow rate of air in the tanks ranges from 100-350 cfm.
Hydrogen monitors are installed on all of the Type III waste tanks and the older waste tanks that have received fresh waste. These monitors are set to alarm when the hydrogen concentration reaches 10% of the lower flammable lirhit (Ill) in air (490) [13] . In the event that the ventilation system is shut down, administrative procedures require that the system be returned to operating condition within a period of time determined by the decay heat load of the tank [21] . For those tanks that do not have permanently installed monitors, the vapor space is sampled on a periodic basis and the concentration of flammable gases determined.
Benzene is a volatile organic compound that can form flammable vapor mixtures with air. The lower flammable limit for benzene in air is 1.3% [24] . Three forms of benzene, dissolved in aqueous solution, sorbed onto tetraphenylborate (TPB) solids and liquid benzene, are produced by chemical and radiolytic decomposition of TPB salts during the ITP process. Benzene releases to the vapor phase in an attempt to establish equilibrium between the liquid and vapor phases. Continual ventilation of the tank acts to pump the liquid benzene from the liquid phase into the vapor phase and out of the tank. When the formation rate of benzene exceeds the release rate, the solution can reach saturation and a separate liquid benzene phase can form. Increased benzene release occurs upon addition of mechanical energy to the TPB slurry (e.g., operation of mixing pumps) and upon dissolution of TPB solids [114-1 17].
The ITP processing and storage tanks and the filtrate hold tanks are purged with nitrogen. This" will maintain the concentrations of flammable gases below their LFL in air and reduce the oxygen concentration to a level below that which is required to support combustion. Recommended operational safety requirements limit the oxygenc oncentration in these facilities to less than 6.990 by volume [25, 26] . During certain design-basis events, the ventilation system can be lost. Unless the ventilation is restored, the concentration of benzene and hydrogen could increase above the LFL and sufficient oxygen will be exchanged from the outside atmosphere to reach the minimum oxygen concentration required for combustion. For Tank 48H, the inventory of benzene is limited so that following a sudden release of retained benzene and hydrogen, the time to the composite lower flammable limit (CLFL) is 18 days in the absence of inerting and/or ventilation [25] . Tank 49H operates under a JCO [26]. The current benzene production rate exceeds the rate on which the minimum of 9 days to CLFL [25] was based. Consequently, compensatory controls were established to ensure the preservation of an inert atmosphere [26] .
DWPF uses Surfynol@ 104E and ITP recommended the use of Surfynol@ 420 to control foaming in the Late Wash facility. Surfynol@ 420 was not used in the ITP process prior to halting ITP operations in 1998. Thus, the only source of Surfynol@ defoamers in tank farm facilities is currently into the H-Area tank farm from the receipt of the DWPF recycle stream (see Table IV ). Tanks 43H, 38H, 22H and 21H normally receive the
,.
WSRC-TR-91-444, revision 3 page -14-February, 2000 I DWPF recycle stream. Liquid waste from Tank 43H is evaporated in the 2-H Evaporator. The concentrated waste transfers from the evaporator into Tank 38H.
The active ingredient in Surfynol@ 104E is an acetylenic glycol, 2,4,7,9 Ttetramethyl-5-
I
decyne-4,7-diol dissolved in ethylene glycol. ,Radiolytic and chemical decomposition of the ace~ylenic glycol in Surfynol@ 104E will produce acetylene, other terminal alkynes,
methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK) and low molecular weight alcohols [28, 29] . These organic compounds are volatile and, therefore, would increase the hazard of flammable vapor compositions in tank farm facilities if present in significant quantities. .0
Bibler and Swingle reported that the time to reach 25% of the LFL for acetylene/air mixtures in Tank 43H from the decomposition of 2000 ppm containing Surfynol@ 420 in 968,000 gallons of waste is 490 hours [30] . Smaller waste volumes (larger tank vapor 'volumes) increases the time to reach 25% of the LFL. The maximum concentration of the acetylenic glycol in the DWPF recycle stream from Surfynol@ 104 is about 20 times lower than that planned for use at the Late Wash facility from Surfynol@ 420. Consequently, acetylene production will be much slower resulting in a much longer time period before reaching 25% of the LFL. Thus, the presence of no more than 100 ppm of Surfynol@ 104 in the DWPF recycle stream is not an explosion hazard upon transfer into tank farm facilities.
Other flammable gases that conceivably are produced in the waste tanks include ammonia, methane, ethane, ethylene, and n-butanol. The amount of ammonia and organic compounds in fresh waste is limited to reduce the possible formation of flammable ammonia and organic vapor mixtures [1] . Recent analyses of samples taken from pump tanks (3F and 5H) and fresh, waste receipt tanks (38H, 43H, 26F, 33F, 34F, and 46F) indicate that the total ammonia and organic content is very low [31] [32] [33] . Results also indicated no detectable quantities of volatile or semi-volatile organic compounds in any of the samples except for siloxane-type materials in the Tank 38H sample. The siloxane materials are not a flammability hazard and may have originated from the extraction disks used to obtain the sample.
Because of the very low ammonia and organic content and the active ventilation systems on each tank, the generation of flammable vapor mixtures is not possible. Even in the event of a loss of the ventilation system, analytical results to date indicate that the accumulation of flammable vapor mixtures is not possible due to the very low organic content in the waste [32, 33] . Thus, these flammable gases do not present an explosion hazard in tank farm facilities.
Metal Nitrides
In 1970, popping noises were heard when personnel stepped on dried waste deposits, when equipment bumped into surfaces contaminated with dried waste, and when a sampling tool was intentionally scraped against dried waste in separate incidents at the Tank 2 lH feed-jet enclosure and 242-H evaporator cell. Analysis of a sample of material removed from the inlet feed jumper indicated 92% mercury and 69Z0silver [34] . An investigation of the incident implicated silver nitride as the cause of the explosive deposits [35] .
., Silver nitride is formed by the decomposition of silver diammine solutions. Since silver and ammonia are known to be present in the waste sent to the evaporator, conditions -existed in which silver nitride could have formed. Although the dried waste deposits exhibited an observable reaction, the reaction dld not propagate; dried waste deposits adj scent to the waste deposits that were contacted did not undergo observable reaction.
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An estimated 55 kilograms of silver transferred into Tank 13H from the flushing of silver coated Berl saddles located in the H-Area separations canyon during the time period of November 10, 1969 to May 13, 1970 [36] . From Tank 13H, the material transfened into Tank 21H, which was the lH evaporator feed tank during this time. A total of 1.95 million gallons of waste transferred into Tank 21H from Tank 13H during this period. A total of 2.99 million gallons of waste processed through the evaporator producing 0.83 million gallons of concentrated waste that went into Tank 10H. After cooling, approximately 30,000 gallons of saltcake crystallized. After cooling, the concentrated supematant liquid transferred from Tank 10H into Tank 1lH, Tank 14H, and Tank 16H [37, 38] .
During May and the remainder of 1970, a concerted effort was made to mix the concentrated silver-containing waste with other waste to dilute the silver content. Multiple waste transfers were made between Tanks 13H, 1lH, 14H,'15H, and 16H to dilute the silver content. During this time an additional 1.9 million gallons of waste, that contained no or only a trace of silver, transferred into the lH evaporator system from the Receipt Basin for Offsite Fuels and Tank 12H [37, 38] . Also, the saltcake produced between November 1969 and May 1970 was dissolved and mixed with the other concentrated supernatant liquid as described above [39] .
Given the volume of waste originally present in the lH evaporator system as well as that which was added that contained no or only a trace amount of silver, it is estimated that the silver concentration in the waste was diluted by a factor of two. The introduction of silver into waste tanks was discontinued in 1970. Since this administrative control has been in place, no other incidents of this type have been observed in tank farm operations.
F-Area also received silver containing wastes as a result of flushing the F-Canyon iodine reactors. For the period from July 1956 to October 1970, a total of310 kilograms of silver transferred into Tank 7F [40] . No incidents of popping noises have ever been reported with waste transferred into this tank or processed through the 2F Evaporator. As in the case of the H-Area waste, the silver-containing waste was diluted with other waste that contained no or onl y a trace amount of silver. Based on waste transfer records the silver was diluted by a factor of 150 with other fresh waste and by a factor of 2 with concentrated waste in thes ystem [37,3 8] . Thus, the concentration of silver in the waste associated with Tank 7F and the 2F Evaporator system is very low. Over the 29 year WSRC-TR-91-444, revision 3 page -16-February, 2000 I period since the last silver addition was made, the ammonia has volatilized /md any silver nitride that may have formed has hydrolyzed.
Silver-containing waste will be removed and processed for disposal during the ITP and ESP operations. However, the hazard of handling this waste is very low because of the hydrolysis of the silver nitride, the dilution of the silver-containing waste, and the lack of apropagating reaction for the dried waste. Metal nitrides hydrolyze in aqueous solutions producing the metal hydroxide and ammonia [41] . Thus, any silver nitride that may have formed initially has decomposed during the 29 years of storage. During waste removal, -any silver-containing waste will be diluted with dissolution water and mixed with other tank waste so that the silver concentration will not be any greater than that sent to the evaporator in 1970. If small amounts of the waste still containing silver nitride were dried and contacted, propagation of the reaction to other waste will not occur based on the behavior exhibited in the 1970 incidents.
Ammonia Compounds and Derivatives Ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrite, and ammonia/air mixtures are well-documented explosive hazards [8] . Impure ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrite are reported to be much more explosive than chemically pure compounds. The presence of organic material not only increases the sensitivity of the ammonium nitrate to decomposition, but also increases the energy released by reacting with the oxygen present in the air [42] .
Ammonium nitrate has been transferred from the chemical separations operations to the waste tanks. The first reported transfer of a large quantity of ammonium nitrate occurred in 1976, when approximate y 3100 kg of ammonium nitrate was discharged to two waste tanks from flushes of the separation canyon vessel vent filters [14] . Because of the low ammonium nitrate and organic carbon content in the waste, the high water content of the waste, and the active ventilation system on the waste tanks, the presence of ammonium nitrate in the waste is not an explosive hazard during storage. For tanks containing dry waste, recent experimental work indicated no evidence of highly exothermic reactions in simulated dry waste materials containing nitrate [11] . The only hazard of the discharge of the ammonium nitrate to the tank farm is the formation of flammable ammonia/air mixtures.
Because of the high pH, the ammonium ion is converted to ammonia. Ammonia is very volatile and is released into the tank vapor space. To prevent the fomnation of explosive ammonia/air vapor mixtures, transfers of ammonium nitrate into the tank farm were carefully controlled under written procedure [43] . The procedure limited the concentration of ammonium nitrate to <2.5 wt % and the quantity of ammonium nitiate that could be received in any twelve-hour period to <1000 kilograms. This limit maintained a safe concentration of ammonia in tank vapor space and in the evaporator overheads. During transfers, the vapor space was monitored for ammonia. Transfers were stopped if the ventilation system was lost or if the ammonia concentration exceeded 1.5 vol %; which is an order of magnitude less than the lower explosive limit of 16 vol % " for ammonia/air vapor mixtures [2~]. In the event that the tank~entilation system was interrupted, portable generators and blowers were available in each tank farm to restore active ventilation to the tanks in the event that the permanent y installed equipment could not be returned to service quickly.
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In 1998, based on a recommendation by Jamison [44] , this control was revised in the Tank Farm Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). The WAC limits influent transfers of ammonia to <15% of the CLFL under liquid-vapor equilibrium [1] . More recently, Swingle and White reevaluated the Tank Farm Waste Acceptance Criteria for ammonia [45] . They recommended that the allowable ammonia concentration be adjusted and tied to limits on sodium and free hydroxide concentrations. The revised ammonia limit will be based on the studies in progress at SRTC [117]. The current limit is implemented to ensure that the irnrnonia limit is conservative for the influent waste composition. The revised limit will provide a means to establish controls based on influent composition, allowing for more flexible and safe operation.
The evaporation of fresh waste further decreases the ammonia/amrnonium ion content of the waste. Ammonium nitrate is more soluble than sodium nitrate in water [46] . Thus, any ammonium ion that is still present in the waste after evaporation will not crystallize but will remain in solution. Upon further storage, the ammonium ion continues to be discharged to the vapor space as ammonia. Thus, the concentration of ammoniundammonia decreases with storage time and there is no identified mechanism for concentrating ammonium nitrate in tank farm facilities.
The Separations facilities use two other ammonia derivatives, hydrazine and hydroxylamine, as reductants in fuel processing operations. Both compounds are " explosive under certain conditions. However, because of the chemical instability of each compound to the conditions present in the fuel separations processes and tank farm handling facilities, neither are present in stored waste.
Hydrazine reacts rapidly with nitrous acid to produce nitrogen, nitrous oxide, and water [14] . This reaction is used in the fuel separations processing operations to destroy excess hydrazine without forming ammonia. Hydrazine is a powerful reductant in basic solutions [47] . Known species in the waste that reacts with hydrazine include nitrate, nitrite, and hydroxide. If insufficient amounts of nitrite were added to destroy the hydrazine during chemical separations, the hydrazine would rapidly react with oxidants or metal ions in solution when the waste is neutralized. Thus, no hydrazine is present in the highly alkaline SRS waste.
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Alkaline solutions of hydroxylamine are unstable and decompose to give a mixture of nitrous oxide and ammonia. The rate of reaction is dependent on the concentrations of hydroxide and hydroxylamine and temperature. Because of the high hydroxide concentration and moderate temperatures in the waste tanks, the decomposition of hydroxylamine is fairly rapid. Thus, any hydroxylarnine that is discharged to the tank farm will decompose rapidly and will not be present in stored SRS waste.
. . In addition to limiting the quantity of organics, the Waste Compliance Plans for the F and H-Area Separations Facilities and the DWPF indicate that the facility will not initiate transfers of waste to the tank farms if the waste temperature is above 50 'C. RBOF/RRF waste is very dilute and currently has no external means to heat the waste above ambient temperature. Thus, the waste temperature would not be expected to exceed the maximum seasonal ambient temperature of 38 "C. Limiting the waste temperature to <50 "C at the waste generator should maintain waste temperatures in the pump tanks and waste tanks below 70 'C. This temperature is below the reported flash point of 74 'C for dodecane, the organic diluent having the lowest flash point.
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For the organic pump tanks and waste tanks, the active ventilation system keeps the flammable organic concentration below the LFL, just as in the case of hydrogen, Administrative controls were established to minimize heat introduction into these organic tanks and to maintain ventilation during waste transfer [21, 117]. For non-organic pump tanks and waste tanks, the liquid waste temperature is restricted based on the Tank Farm Technical Safety Requirements [13] .
Organic solvent is entrained and dissolved to some extent in the waste streams that enter the tank farm from chemical separations. The organic solvent consists of TBP in organic diluents, which are primarily dodecane. The LFL for dodecane in air is 0.6 vol %. Because of the high volatility of dodecane and similar n-paraffins, these compounds are removed from the waste during storage and evaporation. Based on modeling of the evaporation of organic liquids from waste tanks, the life cycle time of dodecane and nparaffins in SRS waste tanks is only a few months due to the low concentration and active ventilation systems [50]. TBP is known to hydrolyze in alkaline solutions producing di-n-butyl phosphate and nt butanol. The flash point of TBP is -181 "C [34] , which is well above temperatures at which waste is stored or heated during evaporation. During evaporation, the high water content in the evaporator vapor space prevents the accumulation of a flammable vapor mixture during evaporation. n-Butanol has a LFL in air of 1.7% [24] . Laboratory tests showed that no ignition of the organic material occurs when a salt solution heated to 70 'C, containing 530 mg/L of n-butanol with a layer of TBP on the surface, is contacted with a butane flame [52] . Thus, the discharge of TBP into tank farm facilities is not an explosive hazard.
A tank safety issue at Hanford arose concerning the possible long-term survival of "red oil" material within Hanford waste tanks. If a quantity of a "red oil" material was inadvertently formed in uranium processing operations and subsequently routed to the waste tanks, would this material continue to exist in an energetic form for prolonged periods inside the waste tanks? "Red Oil" is produced when organic materials have been inadvertently allowed to enter vessels containing uranyl nitrate solutions that are heated to relatively high temperatures [53] . The organic materials have been TBP and hydrocarbon diluent and the decomposition products of these materials. A total of three "red oil" incidents have occurred in uranium processing facilities at SRS and Hanford.
Watkin and Gordon conducted an extensive laboratory study investigating the preparation and subsequent stability of "red oil" under the alkaline waste tank conditions [54] . The key finding of their work indicated that "red oil" is not stable under alkaline conditions. Upon contact of the "red oil" with simulated waste solutions for as short as a few minutes, the resulting mixture, after drying, exhibited a differential scanning calorimetry/thermal gravimetric analysis (DSC/TGA) energy of less than 314 J g"'.
Within the Hanford Tank Safety Program, a dry waste material having a DSC/TGA value of less than 314 J g-l is not considered to pose a threat to interim safe storage within a waste tank. High-level waste at SRS is stored under highly alkaline conditions as is the waste at the Hanford site. Thus, in the unlikely event that "red oil" was produced in the uranium processing facilities at SRS and inadvertently transferred to a waste tank, the material will rapidly decompose upon contact with the alkaline waste and not pose a safety threat to storage within a waste tank.
A potential inadequacy in the safety analysis concerning organic compounds in Tank Farm operations was declared in 1998 [55]. The PISA indicated that the impact of organic compounds on the accident analysis calculations for deflagration in Tank Farm process areas may not be adequate. Specifically, the current controls (organic concentrations, temperature, and ventilation) were established to prevent the formation of flammable vapor concentrations in waste tanks, but not in transfer pump tanks and WSRC-TR-9 1-444, revision 3 page -20-February, 2000 I evaporators. Resolution of this issue is in progress. Activities underway include engineering analyses of the impact of organics and implementation of compensatory measures.
As part of the engineering analysis, vapor and liquid samples were recently taken and analyzed from pump tanks and waste tanks that routinely receive fresh waste containing organics. Sampling included Pump Tanks 5-H and 3-F and Waste Tanks 38H, 43H, 26F, 33F and 46F. Vapor samples taken from Pump Tanks 5-H and 3-F exhibited trace amounts of organics that are several orders of magnitude below that which would, be a flammability concern [32] . Liquid samples taken at and below the surface of the waste in the waste tanks analyzed to contain low concentrations of organics [32, 33] . The concentrations of organics are well below levels that would be a flammability concern. Additional vapor and liquid samples will be taken and analyzed in FY2000. The results of these analyses will be used to complete engineering analyses and determine if existing controls are adequate to ensure safe operations throughout the tank farms. Laboratory studies have identified the presence of a number of aromatic compounds, including phenol and nitrated aromatics, in off-gas condensates from several unit operations within the DWPF that are reported to be explosive under certain conditions [8, 9, 19] . Table IV provides a list of the compounds that have been detected. The various off-gas condensates will be combined within the DWPF and recycled to the tank farm after adjusting the pH of the stream with sodium hydroxide to meet waste acceptance criteria [1] .
.,
WSRC-TR-9 1-444, revision 3 page -21-February, 2000 I Based on a review of the reported literature, phenol (phenoxide in high pH solutions) is relatively stable [60] . A potentially hazardous rapid exotherrnic reaction was reported upon the addition of an acidic sodium nitrate solution to phenol [8] . High-level waste contains high concentrations of nitrate, but is strongly alkaline. Thus, an exothermic reaction between phenoxide and the alkaline waste will not occur upon introduction of the DWPF Recycle Stream to the tank farm. Experimental studies determined the fate and impact of the introduction of phenol/phenoxide into tank farm operations to ensure there are no exothermic reactions between phenol /phenoxide or the radiolytic decomposition products of phenol/phenoxide and other waste components [61] [62] [63] .
Under alkaline conditions, the nitrated aromatics convert to the respective sodium salts, which are also explosive [8] 
CLASSES THAT ARE NOT A HAZARD
Metal Fulminates Silver and mercury fulminates are commonly prepared by the addition of acidic silver or mercury nitrate solutions to an alcohol and allowing the mixture to stand [66] . A mixture of mercuric oxide and mercury fulminate reportedly forms when a solution of mercuric chloride in ether is added to an ice-cold solution of monochloroformoxime in sodium hydroxide [120] . Formation of metal fulminates by either of these methods appears unfavorable in tank farm operations due to the waste composition and environmental conditions. Acidic solutions of mercury and silver are unlikely due to the controls in place to make all waste alkaline prior to transfer into the 'tank farms. Alcohol concentrations are also very low in HLW. Monochloroformoxime or its precursor, monochloroforrnaldehyde are not used on site. Although, formate and chloride are present in HLW, monochloroformaldehyde would not form from these species under tank farm conditions WSRC-TR-91-444, revision 3 page -23-February, 2000 I [121] . Oximes form by the reaction of ketones or aldehydes and hydroxlamines with the elimination of water. In the event that both reagents would be present, the high water content of the waste would retard the formation of the oxime. Thus, the chemistry present in tank farm operations is very unfavorable for the formation of metal fulminates.
During the investigation of an incident in 1970, metal fulminates were identified as possibly being formed. Laboratory tests were conducted to determine if silver and mercury fulminates are prepared under conditions present in the waste tanks. The tests indicated that fulminates =e not produced at the conditions existing in the waste .
tanks [35] .
Since 1970, the introduction of silver into the tank farm from the flushing of silver-coated Berl saddles has been stopped. Mercury is used in Separations processing as a catalyst for the dissolution of aluminum. Most of the mercury is precipitated upon neutralization of the high-level waste. However, some of the mercury is soluble at the high pH. Therefore, a fraction of the mercury entering the tank farm will be present in the solutions transferred to salt processing. Alcohols have not been used as process chemicals at SRS and are only present in trace amounts as a result of laboratory operations and decomposition of tri-n-butyl phosphate and other organics. Methanol and isopropanol are two impurities which will be present in the monosodium titanate (MST) slurry that was used in the ITP process and expected to be used in the alternate salt process. To reduce the quantity of alcohol that is introduced into the tank farm, the maximum amount of alcohol in the MST slurry is limited to 3910by volume [68] . MST slurries, prepared and submitted to WSRC by vendors, have been analyzed to contain <0.1 ?toby volume alcohols.
Assuming the alcohol concentration of the MST slurry is 3% by volume, calculation indicate the maximum possible alcohol concentration in the ITP precipitation tank at 160 ppm [69] . The concentration of alcohol will be further reduced upon filtering and washing of the slurry in subsequent processing steps. Also, some of the alcohol will be removed from the decontaminated supernate during benzene stripping. Because of the very low concentration of alcohol and the relatively low concentrations of silver and mercury, the formation of silver and mercury fulminates is extremely unfavorable in tank farm facilities.
Although the formation of mercury fulminate is extremely unlikely in HLW, evaluation of energetic reactions in dry sludge included this compound to serve as a standard for possible energetic mercury compounds [1 1]. Impact testing with simulated sludges containing up to 21.5 wt 9'omercury fulminate exhibited no signs of reaction or sensitivity. Calorimetry measurements of the mixtures exhibited a low-energy exothermic reaction of roughly the same magnitude as pure mercury fulminate. addition of organic materials did not alter the calorimetry measurements. 
I
In the unlikely event that metal fulminates transferred into or were produced in the waste tanks, the combination of high alkalinity and high radiation field in the waste tanks will decompose the metal fulminates into less energetic materials. Thus metal fulminates I cannot accumulate and, therefore, are not an explosion hazard in tank farm facilities. -
Metal Azides
Hydrazoic acid, HN3, is reported to be dangerously explosive [8] . The minimum explosive concentration of HN3 is reported to be 4.7 M (17 wt Vo)in aqueous solutions.
Heavy metal azides such as silver, mercury, lead, cadmium, and barium are also reported to be explosive and have been used in detonation assemblies [72] . Electropositive metal azides such as sodium azide are not explosive, and decompose smoothly at temperatures above 300 "C [47].
Azide ion is reported to react with nitrite to produce nitrous oxide and nitrogen as given in equation 1 [73] . Reaction rates have not been reported under alkaline conditions. Because of the high nitrite concentration in high-level nuclear waste and the low volubility of heavy metals at high pH, there is no conceivable mechanism by which hydrazoic acid andlor metal azides are produced during storage or during DWPF feed preparation processes. As a result, the formation of explosive azides is not a significant hazard in tank farm operations.
4N," + 2N02" = 4N,0 + 3N2
Hydrazoic acid is known to be one of the products from the reaction of hydrazine with nitrite in nitric acid solutions [74] . From a consideration of the accumulation of explosive solutions by distillation or the formation of explosive mixtures of hydrazoic acid in air by vaporization, it was established that a concentration of 0.05 M hydrazoic acid in process solutions is a safe limit for the Separations canyons [74] . Based on laboratory studies and actual measurements of process solutions, the maximum concentration of hydrozic acid in unneutralized waste solutions is 0.012 M [74].
Each of the 1970 incidents associated with dried waste deposits in the Tank 21H feed jet enclosure (see Metal Nitrides section) occurred shortly after flushing of silver-coated Berl saddles in Separations operations. Mercury and silver fulminates were eliminated as the cause when attempts to prepare either compound were not successful in the laboratory [35] . Mercury and silver azides were ruled out as possible candidates because of the instability of these compounds in high radiation fields [20] .
Metal azides are possibly produced during Separations processing. Mercuric ion is the only heavy metal ion present in significant quantities during the generation of hydrazoic acid. Thus, mercuric azide is the only metal nitride that deemed possible as forming at . Laboratory tests indicated no spontaneous detonations in aqueous mercuric solutions containing less than 0.02 M azide [35] . In tests with both ferric and mercuric ions present (which more accurately represent actual process conditions), the precipitated solids were not detonated at mercury concentrations up to 0.08 M and azide concentrations up to 0.16 M. These concentrations greatly exceed the concentrations of mercury and azide in neutralized stored waste.
Metal NO= Compounds .
Reported explosive compounds of this type include the anhydrous form and salts of Millon's base, lead hyponitrite, silver hyponitrite, and nitrate salts. Sodium nitrate is a strong oxidant. Impregnation of cellulosic materials (e.g., wood and paper) with sodium nitrate increases the combustibility [8] of the cellulosic materials.
The only identified source of cellulosic materials into tank farm facilities is that present in the Antifoam B Emulsion (l-5 'ZOmethylcellulose) used to minimize foaming in HLW evaporators. The quantity of methylcellulose added to the waste is very small. Records indicate no more than 320 kg of methylcellulose was added during FY99 [76] .
No incidents of uncontrolled reactions have been reported during evaporator operations and laboratory evaluations using this defoamer [47]. The high water content and low oxidizing power of nitrate under alkaline conditions prevent rapid reaction between the nitrate and the methylcellulose. Nitration of cellulose occurs only under strongly acidic conditions and elevated temperatures (>160 "C) [8, 9] . Cellulosic materials will decompose during storage due to radiolysis and alkaline hydrolysis [78] . Consequently, the small amount of methylcellulose added to the waste from Antifoam B Emulsion use will not accumulate in tank farm facilities and does not present an explosion hazard.
Hyponitrite forms by reacting hydroxylamine with nitrite and the reduction of nitrite by sodium amalgam [47] . Sodium amalgam and hydroxylamine are not present in SRS waste, and therefore, hyponitrites are not prepared by these reactions in SRS waste tanks. However, nitrate is reduced by radiolysis to nitrite, and thus, lower oxidation state nitrogen-oxygen compounds such as hyponitrite may be produced radiolyticall y. Mercury, lead, and silver are all present in SRS waste, and thus, hyponitrite salts with these metals are conceivable.
Lead and mercuric hyponitrite are reported to decompose in the presence of sodium hydroxide. Because of the high hydroxide concentration in SRS waste, both of these compounds are not stable and sufficient quantities do not exist to present a hazard. The introduction of silver-containing waste into the tank farms was stopped in 1970. As a result, the concentration of silver in SRS waste is very low and is not concentrated by the ITP or ESP operations. Thus, the formation of silver hyponitrite is very unlikely. In 1988, shock-sensitive deposits were detected on laboratory corrosion test specimens immersed in solutions simulating the DWPF off-gas condensate stream, which will be recycled to the H-Area tank farm. This stre~is a relatively dilute aqueous solution containing nitrate, mercury, phenoxide, and halides. Nitrite and hydroxide will be added to the waste stream to inhibit against possible pitting corrosion of the carbon steel waste tanks. .
Conclusive identification of the compound was not possible due to the small quantity of material isolated. Based on the analytical results obtained, the deposits contained mercury and nitrogen. The solid deposits may be a salt of Millon's base or some other mercury NOX compound [79] .
From 1991 to 1993, three separate laboratory studies were carried out to reproduce the formation of the shock-sensitive deposits [80] [81] [82] . Test conditions were also expanded to bound conditions that will occur in the waste storage tanks, These tests included steel with mill-scale representing the primary tank vessel, addition of ammonia, and variations in waste composition to reflect changes in the DWPF flowsheet.
Deposits and films were observed in some of the tests. However, none of the deposits or films exhibited shock-sensitive properties as observed in 1988. Since the latter tests showed no evidence of shock-sensitive deposits, it was concluded that the deposits found in 1988 were the result of impurities in the reagent chemicals and that the production of shock-sensitive deposits is extremely unlikely to occur upon introduction of the DWPF Recycle Stream into the tank farm {83].
Halogen Compounds
Chloride is present in the high-level waste as an impurity in the sodium hydroxide used to neutralize acidic waste before introduction into the carbon steel waste storage tanks. Typical waste from standard Separation processes contains about 0.05 g/L of chloride. Two tanks have received waste containing higher levels of chloride. Tank 5F received about 250 kg of chloride ([Cl-] = 0.095 g/L) and Tank 8F received about 2300 kg of chloride ([Cl-] = 0.9 g/L) from a special curium processing operation at the Savannah River Laboratory [84] . The high chloride waste was mixed with other plant waste and sent to these tanks. Supernatant liquids from both of these tanks were subsequently concentrated by evaporation and the concentrate transferred to salt receiving tanks in FArea following normal waste management practices.
Iodine "is a fission product present in the spent fuel. Most of the iodine is removed by scrubbing the off-gases from fuel dissolution with silver impregnated Berl saddles (iodine reactors). The silver iodide is removed from the saddles with acid flushes. The acid solutions are then made alkaline with sodium hydroxide and sent to the tank farm. A small amount of the fission-product iodine is reduced to iodide and travels through fuel processing operations and is received into the tank farm with standard waste. Halo-nitrogen compounds such as nitrogen triiodide and nitrogen trichloride and halooxygen compounds such as chlorine dioxide and dichloride heptaoxide are known to be explosive under certain conditions [8, 9] . All of the necessary elements are present in SRS for each of these compounds. However, the conditions necessary to produce these compounds are not present in the SRS chemical separations and waste handling facilities. Also, these compounds are not stable in highly alkaline aqueous solutions. Nitrogen triiodide is reported to decompose upon exposure to ionizing radiation [20] . Consequently, conditions within tank farm facilities prevent the production or accumulation of these compounds in sufficiently large enough quantities to be an explosion hazard.
Nitrogen trichlofide and nitrogen triiodide are formed by reacting the ammonium halide with the appropriate hypohalous acid or halogen gas [85] . Traces of hypohalous acid or halogen may be present during chemical separations, and thus, these compounds maybe formed in the separations canyon. However, under alkaline conditions, neither hypohalous acid or halogen gas are present in tank farm operations. Nitrogen trichloride and nitrogen triiodide are readily hydrolyzed in alkaline solution to reform ammonium halide and nitrogen. Since SRS waste contains a high water content, any nitrogen halide formed during separations processing is hydrolyzed to non-explosive compounds.
Chlorine dioxide can be produced by one of four reactions: (1) disproportionation of chloric acid, (2) oxidation of chlorite with chlorine, (3) reduction of chlorate with oxalic acid, and (4) reaction of chloride and chlorate in acid [85] . Since chlorine and acid conditions do not exist during waste processing and storage operations, chlorine dioxide is not generated. During cleaning of a waste tank with oxalic acid, there exists the possibility of generating chlorine oxide if chlorate were present. Chlorate is not a process chemical, but conceivably produced by the oxidation of chloride. However, from the enthalpy of formation, the concentration of chlorate in the highly alkaline waste based on the bounding chloride concentration is calculated to be no more than 3.1 x 1O-Z9M. Thus, the amount of chlorine dioxide that is produced is extremely small and is not an explosion hazard.
Dichloride heptaoxide is produced by the dehydration of perchloric acid. Perchlorates are not used as process chemicals at SRS and the formation of appreciable amounts of perchlorates is not possible based on thermodynamics (see Metal Oxohalogenates). Since the waste is stored as highly alkaline aqueous slurry, dehydration of perchloric acid, if present, is highly unlikely.
Metal-Amine Complexes
Amine complexes of metals containing oxyanion Iigands have been reported to be explosive and exhibit moderate to strong shock sensitivity. These compounds are particularly hazardous because of the presence of both fuel (amine) and oxidant (oxyanion ligand) in the same compound. SRS waste contains all three species for forming complexes of this type: ammonia, metal ions, and oxyanions (e.g. nitrate, nitrite, .
WSRC-TR-9 1-444, revision 3 page -28-February, 2000 I and sulfate). Metals ions that are present in SRS waste and conceivably form amine complexes include copper, chromium, cobalt, mercury, palladium, silver, and zinc.
The chemistry existing in SRS tank farm operations is extremely unfavorable for the formation of these complexes. Also, any metal amine complexes that might be introduced into the tank farm rapidly decompose because of the high pH and produce non-explosive compounds. Thus, metal amine complexes are not an explosion hazard in SRS waste tank farm facilities. .
Preparation of metal-amine complexes is generally carried out in concentrated ammonium hydroxide solution or liquid ammonia. Syntheses of metal amine complexes have also been reported in which metal salts are treated with ammonia gas at elevated temperature [86] . None of these conditions exist in any tank farm facility or operation.
Metal-amine complexes are known to hydrolyze in aqueous solutions. The reactivity of a particular complex varies for different metals and the specific chemical conditions (e.g concentration, pH and temperature) [87] . At the pH that is maintained in the waste tanks (pH > 12), the metal-amine complexes rapidly hydrolyze to metal hydroxide and hydrous metal oxide species. Thus, metal-amine complexes are not present in sufficient quantities in SRS wastes to present an explosion hazard.
Nitrate/Oxalate Mixtures Based on the heats of formation, the reaction of sodium nitrate and sodium oxalate is extremely exothennic and would generate large amounts of gas that co'uld exceed the capacity of the HEPA filters on the waste tanks. Since SRS waste is typically evaporated, stored, and processed at temperatures of s155 'C, which is well below the temperatures necessary to initiate exothermic reactions, exothermic reactions of sodium nitrate and oxalate are very unlikely during typical storage and processing operations. The waste in Tank lF experienced a much higher temperature, 340 "C [89] . This temperature is still below that reported for an exothennic reaction to occur. Thus, SRS waste mixtures containing sodium nitrate and sodium oxalate together are not a hazard under existing and past operating conditions. Metal Oxalates During sludge removal from Tank 16, a special procedure using oxalic acid assisted in slurrying the final 159ioof sludge. Under acid conditions, mercury and silver oxides can react with oxalic acid to produce insoluble mercury and silver oxalates [90] . Silver and mercury oxalates are reported to be weakly explosive, and therefore, an experimental study was undertaken to determine the explosive hazards of this procedure.
Based on the amount of mercury in the waste, a calculation estimated the maximum amount of mercury oxalate -in the waste tank at 900 kg. The concentration of silver wasnot known, but based on analysis of similar waste in other tanks, the amount of silver was far less, and thus, the amount of silver oxalate in this tank was insignificant compared to the mercury oxalate. For other waste tanks, the amount of silver maybe significantly higher, and therefore, the amount of silver oxalate may be significant.
Experimental testing indicated that neither compound ignites by an electric arc when dispersed in air [90] . Explosions well below detonation conditions occurred only when the materials were confined or dry and in a pure form. There is no conceivable mechanism by which pure compounds are produced in the tank farm facilities. However, dry metal oxalates maybe present in the dry sludge tanks. Thus, mercury oxalate was selected as one of the standard materials for testing the reactivity of dry sludge [91] . Impact tests indicated that mixtures of simulated sludge containing as much as 14.9 wt % mercury oxalate exhibited no visible signs of reaction. Calorimetry measurements of the same mixtures exhibited no net exothetic behavior since mercury oxalate decomposition occurs at a temperature overlapping a region of endothermic behavior for the pure sludge [11] .
Testing also indicated that both mercury and silver oxalates undergo metathesis reactions under alkaline conditions to give the insoluble metal hydroxides [90] . Fondeur and Wilmarth recently reported that mercury oxalate decomposes upon contact with 1.OM sodium hydroxide or upon irradiation at a gamma dose of 9.5 Mrad [71] . Silver oxalate was not tested, but would be expected to react similarly. Thus, mercury and silver oxalates will not accumulate in tank farm facilities and present an explosion hazard.
Metal Halogenates
Of all halogenates, iodate would be the most thermodynamically favored species [47] . Assuming an iodide concentration of 2. 1x1O"' M [92] and an oxygen concentration of 0.01708 mL/mL of solution [93] , the equilibrium concentration for iodate is 1.1 x 10-"M. This concentration is equivalent to about 10 mg of iodate in a waste tank completely filled with supernate. The concentration of chlorate is calculated to be no more than 3.1 x 10"2' M (see Halogen section). Because of the extremely small amounts of halogenates that are calculated to be present in liquid waste, this class of compounds is not an explosion hazard in SRS tank farm facilities. Potassium, nickel, and mercury are known components of SRS high level waste. However, based on the.absence of an identifiable source of significant amounts of cyanide and cyanate and the instability of both species to the physical and chemical conditions at which waste is stored and processed in the tank farms, the accumulation metal cyanides and metal cyanates in quantities that would be sufficient to be an explosion hazard is unlikely.
Cyanide and cyanate compounds have not been used in processes at the SRS, although very small amounts of cyanide and cyanate may have been introduced in the waste from use at site laboratories or as impurities in process chemicals. Acetonitrile is used in the DWPF analytical laboratory. Estimates indicate that 23 kg of acetonitrile will be discarded to lab wastes each month [94] . This waste will be routed to the DWPF Recycle Collection Tank (RCT). Normally, the pH of this tank is very low, and thus, the acetonitrile will undergo hydrolysis producing acetic acid and ammonia [95] . Prior to transfer of the DWPF Recycle Stream to Tank 43H, the waste in the RCT is made strongly alkaline by addition of concentrated sodium hydroxide solution. Organic nitriles also undergo hydrolysis under alkaline conditions [96] . Thus, any unreacted acetonitrile is hydrolyzed in the strongly alkaline conditions. Therefore, the release of acetonitrile from the DWPF laboratory will not provide a source of large quantities of cyanide in the tank farm for the formation and accumulation of metal cyanide compounds.
Cyanides oxidize easily to cyanates in solution [97] and decompose in the presence of ionizing radiation [20, 98, 99] . Cyanide has not been detected in SRS high-level waste, although in 1986, analysis of a Tank 50H sample indicated a cyanide concentration of 3.6 ppm [100] . Review of the sample analysis indicated that the positive result for cyanide in this sample was an artifact of the experimental procedure. Analytical results for all other Tank 50H samples indicated no evidence of cyanide.
Cyanates undergo radiolytic decomposition [101] and hydrolysis in strongly alkaline solutions [102] . Hydrolysis of cyanate produces carbonate, carbon dioxide, and ammonia. Based on the absence of an identified source of significant amounts of cyanide and cyanate and the instability of both species to the physical and chemical conditions at which waste is stored and processed in the tank farms, metal cyanides and metal cyanates are not an explosion hazard is SRS tank farm facilities. Peroxides I There are three possible types of peroxide explosion hazards: (1) peroxide/organic mixtures, (2) organic peroxides, and (3) metal peroxides. Hydrogen peroxide/organic mixtures explode when the ratio of peroxide to water is >1 and the overall fuel/peroxide composition is close to the stoichiometric value. Metal peroxides explode when heated above 100 'C. Metal peroxides that may conceivably be present in the waste are those of silver, barium, calcium, cadmium, mercury, potassium, sodium, strontium, and zinc.
Hydrogen peroxide is not used at SRS in chemical processing operations. Very small amounts of peroxide may have been added to the tank farm from use at SRTC.
WSRC-TR
Radiolytic generation of peroxide is well known in aqueous solutions [103] . The radiolytic generation rate for peroxide varies slightly with pH, decreasing slightly in alkaline solutions as compared to acidic solutions.
Hydroxyl radical scavengers such as chloride, bromide, iodide, and nitrite decrease the rate for peroxide formation. Since nitrite and"chloride are present in relatively high concentration, the waste suppresses the formation of peroxide. Consequently, there is no plausible mechanism by which peroxide concentration would begin to approach that of water present in the waste. Thus, the possibility of forming an explosive w peroxide/organic mixture is unlikely.
Because of the low organic content of the waste and the instability of organic peroxides in highly alkaline solutions, organic peroxides do not present a safety hazard in tank farm operations. Organic peroxides are conceivably produced in waste by the reaction of organics with oxygen-containing radicals or the combination of two alkoxide radicals. These types of radicals are well known products produced by the radiolysis of water and alcohol solutions. However, the concentration of organics in the waste is very low and as a result, the concentration of organic peroxides generated by either of these pathways is also very low.
Conceivable examples of organic peroxides include perforrnic acid and peracetic acid or their respective sodium salts. Both of these peroxides are very reactive [9,24]. The literature indicates peracetic acid explodes when heated to 105 "C [9] . One of the preferred methods for the disposal of organic peroxides is to treat the peroxide with sodium hydroxide solution [87, 104] . Because of the storage conditions (temperature and high hydroxide concentration) in SRS waste, organic peroxides are not stable, and the accumulation of hazardous quantities of organic peroxide is not possible.
The chemical and physical conditions for the storage and processing of HLW limits the accumulation of metal peroxides in quantities that would be sufficient to be an explosion hazard [105] . Heavy metal peroxides (e.g., Ag, Cd, Hg, and Zn) are not stable in water. Because of the high water content of SRS waste, the heavy metal peroxides are not stable and significant quantities are not produced. Potassium peroxide requires cold temperatures (<10 'C) to remain stable in aqueous solutions. Since SRS waste storage conditions are at higher temperatures (> 30 "C) , potassium peroxide would immediately decompose.
The alkaline earth peroxides (e.g., Ca, Sr, and Ba) are reported to react with sodium carbonates and sulfates precipitating the alkaline earth carbonate or sulfate and liberating oxygen. Since appreciable quantities of carbonate and sulfate are present in SRS waste, any alkaline earth peroxides that might be formed immediate y react with carbonate or sulfate. Sodium peroxide is fairly stable in aqueous solutions and will crystallize from aqueous solution. However, transition metal ions (e.g., Fe, Mn, Cu, Co, and Ni) are known to catalyze the decomposition of sodium peroxide. Since all of these metals are known to be present in SRS waste, it is unlikely that appreciable quantities of sodium peroxide form and crystallize from waste stored in the tank farms.
,,
Metal Acetvlides DWPF uses Surfynol@ 104E and ITP recommended the use of Surfynol@ 420 to control I foaming in the Late Wash facility. Surfynol@ 420 was not used in the ITP process prior to halting ITP operations in 1998. Thus, the only source of Surfynol@ 104E in tank farm I facilities-is currently from the receipt of the Dl@F recycle stiea&. Currently, these faciliti& include Tank 43H, Tank 38H, Tank 22H, Tank 21H and the 2-H Evaporator.
The active ingredient in Surfynol@ 104E is an acetylenic glycol, 2,4,7,9-tetramethyl-5-decyne-4,7-diol dissolved in ethylene glycol. Surfynol@ 420 is an ethylene oxide adduct of 2,4,7,9 -tetramethyl-5-decyne-4,7-diol in ethylene glycol.
Copper, silver and mercury acetylides are known explosives [8, 9] . Decomposition of the acetylenic glycol could produce an acetylide. Since copper, silver and mercury. are present in SRS HLW, the formation of explosive metal acetylides is conceivable. Based on a review of the formation and reaction chemistry of metal acetylides, Hobbs concluded that conditions in the tank farm prohibit the accumulation of metal acetylides in sufficient quantity to be an explosion hazard [106] .
Acetylene and terminal alkynes react with metal ions in solid/vapor reaction or in non aqueous solvents to produce metal acet ylides. If a terminal hydrogen atom is not present, no reaction occurs. The acetylenic glycol in Surfynol@ 104E does not have a I terminal hydrogen and, therefore, will not react directly with metal ions to produce metal acetylides. Radiolytic and chemical decomposition of the acetylenic glycol could produce acetylene, other terminal alkynes, methyl isobutyl ketone and low molecular weight alcohols [28, 29] .
Metal acetylides react with water to produce the alkyne and the corresponding metal hydroxide. The high water content in the waste prevents the accumulation of metal acetylides in the bulk of the waste. Solids adhering to the tank wall may have sufficiently low water content so that the metal acetylide could form and not undergo hydrolysis immediately. However, those tanks in which Surfynol@ defoamers would enter are not static tanks and frequently change in volume resulting in wetting and decomposition of any metal acetylide that formed in the solids. Thus, there is no identified mechanism for the formation and accumulation of metal acetylides and, therefore, this class of explosive compounds is not a hazard in tank farm facilities. I 
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